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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Katherine Lea Stanfield appeais from her judgment of conviction, entered
following a jury trial, for first degree murder by aggravated battery on a child.

On

appeal, she challenges the admission of Dr. Rorke-Adams' expert testimony and argues
that unobjected-to jury instructions were erroneous.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
W.F. died at two and a half years old, the victim of abusive head trauma. (Tr.,
vol.1, p.790, L.7 - p.791, L.22; p.894, L.2 - p.895, L.4; p.985, Ls.2-25; p.991, L.17 p.992, L.24; p.1108, Ls.1-16; p.1223, L.25 - p.1224, L.10; p.1690, L.11 - p.1691, L.5;
p.1768, L.7 - p.1769, L.18; Tr., vol.2, p.2074, Ls.9-11; p.2779, L.14 - p.2780, L.4;
p.2796, L.17 - p.2797, L.2.)

Stanfield was W.F.'s caregiver when he became

"unresponsive." (See Tr., vol.3, p.4197, L.3 - p.4198, L.9.)
A grand jury indicted Stanfield for the first-degree felony murder of W.F., with the
predicate felony of aggravated battery on a child under 12 years of age. (R., pp.17-18.)
After a lengthy trial, the jury convicted Stanfieid of first degree murder.

(R., p.671.)

Thereafter, the district court entered a judgment of conviction against Stanfield,
sentencing her to life imprisonment with ten years fixed. (R., pp.726-28.) Stanfield filed
a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.731-35.)
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ISSUES
Stanfield states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err by allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify as
to the work of a laboratory technician in violation of Ms. Stanfield's Sixth
Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses, or alternatively, by
allowing the introduction of inadmissible hearsay testimony?
2.
Did the district court deprive Ms. Stanfield of her constitutional
rights to due process and a jury trial when it failed to instruct the jury that,
before it could find her guilty of felony murder by aggravated battery of a
child under twelve years of age, it was required to find that she had the
specific intent to commit the crime of aggravated battery and cause great
bodily harm?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Stanfield failed to show that the district court erred by allowing Dr. RorkeAdams to testify about her examination of W.F.'s brain tissue?
2.
The district court instructed the jury on the elements of felony murder with the
predicate felony of aggravated battery on a child under the age of 12 using instructions
substantively identical to instructions found correct by the Idaho Supreme Court in State
v. Carver, Docket No. 39467, 2013 Opinion No. 111 (Idaho, November 26, 2013).
Stanfield did not object. Has Stanfield failed to show error, much less fundamental
error, in the proper jury instructions?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Stanfield Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Al!owirg__.Pr. RorkeAdams To Testi About Her Examination Of W.F.'s Brain Tissue
A.

introduction
At Stanfield's trial, the state called Dr. Rorke-Adams, a forensic neuropathologist

who personally sampled and examined W.F.'s brain tissue, to testify as to her
examination, observations, and conclusions regarding the cause and manner of VV.F.'s
death. During Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony, Stanfield's counsel raised an objection on
"hearsay and confrontation" grounds "as to anything regarding those particular slides"
which Dr. Rorke-Adams' office had prepared in conjunction with her examination of
W.F.'s brain. (Tr., vol.2, p.1996, Ls.10-12.) The prosecutor responded that Dr. RorkeAdams would be testifying regarding her personal "interpretation of reading the tissues,"
not what a technician did. (Id., p.1997, Ls.17-21.) Defense counsel persisted in his
contention that because she was not present for the technician's preparation of the
slides, Dr. Rorke-Adams should not be allowed to testify about her own interpretation of
those slides. (Id., p.1997, L.24 - p.1998, L.4.)
By way of laying additional foundation for her testimony, Dr. Rorke-Adams
explained her office's standard procedures to the court:

The doctor examines the

tissue; cuts the tissue into small pieces and places them in formaldehyde; and then
gives them to a technician to prepare and stain slides.

(Id., p.1996, L.21 - p.1997,

L.12.) The tissues are labeled from beginning to end-when they arrive at the office,
when the doctors examine them, and when they create the samples and give them to
the technician to stain the slides. (!d., p.1998, L.5 - p.1999, L.14.) The office ensures
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that the technician's work staining the slides is done properly by using a control slide.
(Id., p.2000, L.16 - p.2002, L.23.) The district court overruled Stanfield's objection and
allowed Dr. Rorke-Adamstotestifyaboutherfindings. (Id., p.2003, Ls.10-13.)
On appeal, Stanfield asserts that the district court erred by overruiing her
objection, arguing that Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony violated her confrontation rights or
was hearsay. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-23.) Application of the correct legal standards to
Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony, however, shows no violation of Stanfield's rights.

The

district court properly overruled the objection and should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a claimed violation of the Confrontation Clause the appellate

court defers to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but gives free
review to the trial court's legal determinations. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 141,
176 P.3d 911, 913 (2007).

C.

Allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams To Testify About Her Examination Of W.F.'s Brain
Tissue, The Observations She Made During That Examination, And Her
Conclusions Did Not Violate The Confrontation Clause
Stanfield asserts that allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify about her examination,

observations, and conclusions violated Stanfield's confrontation rights.

(Appellant's

brief, pp.7-20.) The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that,
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause
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"applies to 'witnesses' against the accused-in other words, those who 'bear
testimony."'

kl at 51.

The Court he!d that the Confrontation Clause extends to

ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, mater:al
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
dedarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;
extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
use at a later trial.

!d. at 51-52 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, while the Confrontation
Clause is not limited to in-court testimony,

kl at 50,

it is limited to testimonial evidence.

The only testimonial evidence presented at trial regarding Dr. Rorke-Adams'
examination of VV.F.'s brain tissue was the testimony of Dr. Rorke-Adams. Dr. RorkeAdams testified that she received and examined W.F.'s brain and spinal cord tissues.
(Tr., vol.2, p.1992, L. 17 - p.1994, L.20.) She took tissue samples from W.F.'s brain.
(Id., p.1996, L.24 - p.1997, L.12.) In accordance with office policy, Dr. Rorke-Adams
gave those tissue samples to a technician who affixed them to slides and stained them
pursuant to Dr. Rorke-Adams' instructions. (Id., p.1996, L.24 - p.1997, L.13; p.1998,
L.24 - p.1999, L.14; p.2000, L.20 - p.2002, L.23; p.2003, Ls.16-21.) Dr. Rorke-Adams,
utilizing the slides, then conducted a full examination, making observations and findings.
(See Id., p.2007, Ls.1-16; p.2009, L.18 - p.2013, L.13; p.2018, L.23 - p.2021, L.20;
p.2033, L.24 - p.2060, L.6.). Finally, Dr. Rorke-Adams wrote a report of her findings.
(Id., p.2003, Ls.22-25.) Dr. Rorke-Adams was not only available for cross-examination;
she was, in fact, cross-examined. (Id., p.2074, L.16 - p.2125, L.24.) Thus, allowing Dr.
Rorke-Adams to testify did not violate Stanfield's confrontation rights.
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Nevertheless, Stanfield argues that permitting Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify about
her examination of W.F.'s brain tissue, her observations, and her conclusions is a
violation of Stanfield's confrontation rights because Dr. Rorke-Adams' !ab technician
prepared the slides of the tissue samples collected by Dr. Rorke-Adams. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 7-20.) Stanfield asserts that, in order for Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify as to her
own examination, observations, and conclusions, the lab technician should have been
called to testify about his or her procedures in labeling and staining the slides.
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-18.)

Stanfield's argument fails.

Confrontation Clause only applies to testimonial evidence.

As noted above, the
Dr. Rorke-Adams was not

used to vicariously admit any testimonial evidence from the lab technician; in fact, there
was none to admit

The lab technician did not conduct an examination, record

observations, produce a report, or submit an affidavit. The technician merely labeled
and stained slides of brain tissue samples collected by Dr. Rorke-Adams. Stanfield has
failed to cite a single case, and the state is aware of none, in which a lab technician's
labeling and staining of medical slides was held to be testimonial. Dr. Rorke-Adams did
not testify about any factual assertions made by the lab technician. The Confrontation
Clause does not prevent an expert witness, such as Dr. Rorke-Adams, from testifying
as to her own examination, observations, and conclusions because the slides she
reviewed were prepared by a lab technician.
In support of her dubious legal proposition that the Confrontation Clause bars all
"conclusions generated during the scientific testing of evidence" unless every person
who played any role with that evidence testifies, Stanfield cites to Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. _ , 131
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S.Ct. 2705 (2011), and the dissent in Williams v. Illinois,_ U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2221
(2012).

(Appellant's brief, pp.9-11.)

None of the holdings in these cases supports

Star.fieid's argument. In fact, application of the legal holdings of these cases shows that
Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony clearly did not violate Stanfield's confrontation rights.
In Melendez-Diaz the United States Supreme Court held that, because the drug
test reports were affidavits clearly contemplated as testimonial evidence in Cravvford, it
was a violation of the Confrontation Clause for the prosecutor to submit a report into
evidence without calling the person who prepared that report to testify. 557 U.S. at 30911. Melendez-Diaz is inapplicable to Stanfield's case. First, the state never submitted a
report, or affidavit, from the lab technician; indeed, the lab technician did not prepare a
report, so there was nothing for the state to submit. Second, the state never submitted
Dr. Rorke-Adams' physical report into evidence, with or without her testimony. Third,
Dr. Rorke-Adams, the expert analyst who prepared the report in this case, in fact
testified and was subject to cross-examination.
In Bullcoming the United States Supreme Court held that the expert who
"performs or observes the test reported in the certification" is the expert who must be
called to testify. 564 U.S. at_, 131 S.Ct. at 2709-10. The Supreme Court's mandate
in Bullcoming was complied with in this case:

Dr. Rorke-Adams, not her technician,

conducted the examination and generated the report.

Dr. Rorke-Adams, called to

testify, was also subject to cross-examination.
Finally, in Williams, the United States Supreme Court held:
When an expert testifies for the prosecution in a criminal case, the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the expert about any
statements that are offered for their truth. Out-of-court statements that are
related by the expert solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions
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on which that opinion rests are not offered for their truth and thus fall
outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.

-

U.S. at -

, 132 S.Ct. at 2228. Dr. Rorke-Adams did not testify about the contents

of another expert's work; she testified about her own work: her examination, her
observations, her conclusions. At most, she explained why she could rely on the slides
prepared by the technician in conducting her examination-the exact sort of thing the
Supreme Court heid does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Stanfield has failed to show any violation of her right to confront the witnesses
against her. The district court correctly overruled Stanfield's confrontation objection and
should be affirmed.

D.

Dr. Rorke-Adams Did Not Present Hearsay Testimony \Nhen She Testified About
Her Examination. Observations, And Conclusions Regarding W.F.'s Brain Tissue
Alternatively,

Stanfield

argues that Dr.

Rorke-Adams

presented

hearsay

testimony when she testified regarding her examination, observations, and conclusions.
(Appellant's brief, pp.20-23.)

This argument also fails.

Hearsay is an out-of-court

statement offered at trial "to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Rorke-Adams' testimony did not present any hearsay evidence.

1.R.E. 801.

Dr.

Dr. Rorke-Adams

testified as to her observations and her conclusions which she derived from her
examination of W.F.'s brain tissue. That is not hearsay.
Stanfield asserts that "Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that the laboratory technician
had prepared the slides in question in a particular manner." (Appellant's brief, p.21.)
Review of the trial transcripts belies this assertion. In fact, Dr. Rorke-Adams described
her laboratory's routine procedures.

Answering in the affirmative the prosecutor's
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question as to whether she cou!d tell if the technician properly appiied the requested
stain to hsr slides, Dr. Rorke-Adams explained:
Because there's a!ways a control slide that goes with it. Control
slide means that--in this particular case, I asked for a specific antibody to
be applied to this tissue.
In pathology, we have advanced to the point where we can be more
precise now than we could, let's say, 15 or 20 years ago in the
composition of the cells and the changes in the cells because of the
development of a technique which is called "immunoperoxidase."
It's basically an antigen-antibody reaction.
There are certain
antigens in the cells for which antibodies have been developed. So if, for
example, we're concerned about diagnosis of a tumor, we know that
certain tumors contain certain antigens. And antibodies have been
developed using this technique of immunoperoxidase to identify those,
and so it helps us with our diagnosis.
In this particular case, an antibody has been deve,oped to identify a
material called "amyloid." This is a material that we see in the brains, for
example, of people who have Alzheimer's disease. It's also an antigen
that's found in the individuals who suffer traumatic brain injury of a certain
kind.
So when we are trying to determine what exactly-how refined our
diagnosis can be, we ask the-it's a special technician, the
immunoperoxidase technician. There's a special laboratory for it, and we
determine that we want a given study to be done using a particular
antibody.
We fill out a request sheet. We ask specifically for that antibody to
be applied to the tissue. It's given to the technician along with the
specimen. The technician then knows which antibody to use. Those
technical procedures are done in that special laboratory.
And then that prepared slide is given to the pathologist along with
the sheet, the request sheet that we made out asking for that antibody,
plus a control slide, which means that another piece of tissue that was
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known to contain this particular antigen that we're interested in has been
used to corroborate the validity of the stain from the unknown slide.
So we look at the control slide first to make certain that the
technique was working so that we can rely then upon what we're looking
at in the unknown slide.
So these are all standard procedures in the laboratory, and this is
the way it is done every day for all the cases that come through.
(Tr., vol.2, p.2000, L.20 - p.2002, L.23.) Dr. Rorke-Adams did not testify as to how the
particular technician in this particular case went about fulfilling his or her particular
duties; she testified as to the standard procedures her office employs in these cases
and how she personally could determine the slides were properly stained due to the
control slide mechanism her office regularly employs.

Testimony regarding routine

practices is admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 406 without eye witnesses and is
not hearsay.

Likewise, testimony within the personal knowledge of the witness

testifying-in this case that the control slide showed that the staining was properly
done-is not hearsay. Finally, even if the act of staining the slides could be considered
an out-of-court statement, it ,still is not hearsay because "[o]ut-of-court statements that
are related by the expert solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which
that opinion rests are not offered for their truth." Williams,_ U.S. at_, 132 S.Ct. at
2228.

Stanfield has failed to show any instance of Dr. Rorke-Adams presenting hearsay
testimony.

The district court correctly overruled Stanfield's hearsay objection and

should be affirmed.
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E.

!f There Was Err:::r. It \/Vas Harmless
Even if allovving Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify regarding her personal observations

and interpretations of the siides of tissue she sampled was error, any such error was
harmiess in this case.

"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or

excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " 1.R.E. 103(a).
See also I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded."). 'The inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable
doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission
of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923
(2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The state has the burden of demonstrating that an objected-to,
non-constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Perry, 150

Idaho 209,222,245 P.3d 961,974 (2010).
Stanfield notes that Dr. Rorke-Adams "offered very specific testimony which
directly contradicted Ms. Stanfield's version of events," and offers examples of Dr.
Rorke-Adams testifying "that the evidence of axonal injury she observed in the slides
indicated that a severe linear rotating, angular force, akin to whiplash, had been applied
to [W.F.]" and "that the evidence of injury to the medulla was not consistent with a shortfall scenario, nor was it consistent with a child throwing a tantrum," whereas Stanfield
testified that W.F. had simply fallen over. (Appellant's brief, p.19.) Stanfield therefore
asserts that any error in permitting Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify regarding her personal
observations using the brain tissue sample slides cannot be found harmless because "it
is entirely possible that the jury believed Dr. Rorke-Adams, and so, discredited Ms.
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Stanfield's version of events." (Id.)

Conveniently, Stanfield ignores the no less than

seven other medical experts who testified to the exact same facts: that the injuries that
caused W.F.'s death could not have been caused by a short fall scenario as described
by Stanfield in her testimony (or in any of the other scenarios she offered) and that they
could only have been caused by abusive, non-accidental head trauma.

Dr. Bruce Cherny, a pediatric neurologist and neurosurgeon, testified that W.F.'s
brain injury was severe. (Tr., vol.1, p.1195, Ls.3-13.) He discussed the significance of
retinal hemorrhages and how they are associated with abusive head trauma rather than
accidental trauma. (Id., p.1197, L.12 - p.1198, L.14.) He explained that he could see
W.F.'s retinal hemorrhages on his CAT scan when one normally cannot (Id., p.1216, L.6
- p.1217, L.9); that Vv.F.'s injuries were consistent with abusive head trauma, ruling out

all other possible causes (Id., p.1223, L.25 - p.1224, L.10); and that W.F.'s injuries
could not be explained by the mechanism suggested by Stanfield (Id., p.1224, L.19 p.1225, L.8; see also p.1258, Ls.11-15). He opined that "these injuries are substantial
violent forces that are well beyond anything that the toddlers themselves could be
capableofdoingtothemselves." (Id., p.1228, L.16-p.1229, L.6.) Finally, he explained
that W.F.'s retinal hemorrhages are the kind associated with "violent forward and
backward motion, violent shaking, repetitive impacts.'' (Id., p.1241, Ls.11-25.)

Dr. Antonio Bell, a radiologist, also testified that, though it is rare to be able to
see retinal hemorrhages on a CT scan, they could see them on W.F.'s scan and they
were "amongst the largest that [Dr. Bell had) seen in [his) years of practice." (Tr., vol.1,
p.890, L.12 - p.891, L.25.) W.F. had a constellation of injuries-subdural hematoma,
retinal hemorrhages, cerebral edema-all of which were consistent with abusive head
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trauma. (Id., p.929, L.22 - p.930, L.3.) He testified that Vv.F.'s brain injury was severe.
(Id., p.930, Ls.4-6.) So severe, in fact that a child could not acquire the same injury by

simp!y falling, or even throwing itself, to the ground.

(Id., p.893, L.7 - p.894, L.1.)

Rather, the injuries were caused by abusive head trauma. (Id., p.894, L.2 - p.895, L.4.)
Dr. Bell also ruled out a!I other possibilities.

(!d., p.900, Ls.1-9.)

Finally, Dr. Be!I

discussed the timeframe and explained that W.F.'s injury could not have occurred
earlier in the day, before VV.F. was in Stanfield's care. (Id., p.901, L.10 - p.902, L.8.)
Dr. J. Brooks Crawford, a forensic ophthalmologist, testified that W.F.'s eye
injuries were not a result of natural disease. (Tr., vol.1, p.950, Ls.4-17.) The doctor
explained that "considerable force, repetitive forces" would be required to cause W.F.'s
retinal hemorrhages; they could not be caused by accident, noting that "I have never

seen that, and most-any eye pathologist I have seen or talked to has not seen this in
anything-any kind of accidental trauma." (Id., p.957, Ls.2-24; see also p.984, Ls.8-14.)
He confirmed that the injuries were from abuse, not an accident. (Id., p.985, Ls.2-25;
p.991, L.17 - p.992, L.24.) Finally, he explained that the injuries W.F. sustained could
only be caused by repetitive forces, and not simply falling down.

(Id., p.995, L.19 -

p.996, L.20.)

Dr. Jon Fishburn, also an ophthalmologist, testified that W.F.'s injuries were
highly suggestive of non-accidental head trauma (Tr., vol.1, p.790, Ls.7-13) and noted
that he had never seen that degree of injury in a child who merely fell (Id., p.791, Ls.16-

22).

He also explained that, in his experience, causing W.F.'s injuries would require

"excessive trauma, usually rotational because of the whiplash nature of severing or
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shear forces on the vessels and the shifting. Linear trauma or a fall and bump on the
head typically isn't enough force to do that." (Id., p.828, Ls.5-18.)
Dr. Michael Sexton, a chi!d abuse pediatrician, diagnosed W.F. as "a victim of
abusive head trauma." (Tr., vol.2, p.2779, L.14 - p.2780, L.4.) This opinion was based
on a high degree of medical certainty. (!d., p.2796, Ls.12-16; p.2866, Ls.9-17.) Again,
VV.F.'s extensive retinal hemorrhages would not result from an accident or fall.
p.2780, L.5 - p.2781, L.5.)

(Id.,

Dr. Sexton explained that the opinion that such injuries

could be caused by a fall was only held by the fringes of the medical community, and
such theories are not published in the more reputable medical journals. (Id., p.2867, L.1
- p.2868, L.14.) W.F. suffered abusive head trauma and was the victim of physical
abuse. (Id., p.2796, L.17 - p.2797, L.2.)
Dr. Paul Jansen, a pediatric critical care doctor, testified that he was concerned
that W.F. would not survive when he saw him; because the patient history he was given
did not adequately explain W.F.'s bruises, he ordered a CT scan. (Tr., vol.1, p.1086,
L.20 - p.1088, L.6.)

From Dr. Jansen's examinations, he determined that W.F.'s

injuries were the result of abusive head trauma, after ruling out ail other possible
causes.

(id., p.1108, Ls.1-16.)

Dr. Jansen, based on everything he ruled out, and

based on the force required to cause W.F.'s constellation of injuries, concluded that
W.F. died as a result of abusive head trauma and explained that a child falling or
throwing itself to the ground could not create the force necessary to cause W.F.'s
injuries. (Id., p.1124, L.23 - p.1125, L.20.)
Finally, Dr. Charles Garrison, a forensic pathologist, testified that the cause of
W.F.'s death was a homicide involving blunt force trauma, not an accident. (Tr., vol.1,
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p.1690, L.11 -- p.1691, L.5; see also p.1768, L. 7 - p.1769, L.18.) W.F.'s injuries 1,vere
consistent with abusive head trauma, not an accident. (Id., p.1692, Ls.19-25; p.1707,
L.24 - p.1708, L.11; p.1710, Ls.14-20.) The inJuries couid not have been caused by
\VF. falling or throwing himself back, as Stanfieid claimed. (Id., p.1712, L.15 -- p.1713,
L.15.) The short fall scenario described by Stanfield could not cause the constellation of
injuries seen on W.F. (Id., p.1767, Ls.14-25.)
Clearly the jury had much more by way of medical expert testimony establishing
that W.F.'s injuries were the result of abuse, not accident, than Dr. Rorke-Adams'
testimony of what she observed on her medical slides.

With or without Dr. Rorke-

Adams' explanation of what she saw on the slides, the jury would have reached the
inevitable conclusion, based on the voluminous evidence presented in this case, that
W.F. suffered an abusive, non-accidental head trauma. Any error in allowing Dr. RorkeAdams to testify regarding what she personally observed on the medical slides and her
conclusions is therefore harmless.

11.
Stanfield Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The Proper Instructions Given
By The District Court To The Jury
A.

Introduction
A grand jury indicted Stanfield on a charge of felony murder, with the predicate

felony of aggravated battery on a minor under the age of 12. (R., pp.17-18.) At the
close of Stanfield's trial, the district court instructed the jury as to the elements of felony
murder with the predict felony of aggravated battery on a child as follows:
A battery is committed when a person wilfully [sic] and unlawfully
uses force or violence upon the person of another.
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An aggravated battery is a battery which causes great bodily harm.
Murder is the killing of a human being without legal justification or
excuse in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate an aggravated
battery on a child under 12 years of age.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of first degree murder, the
state must prove each of the following: One, on or about December 11,
2009; two, in the state of Idaho; three, the Defendant Katherine Lea
Stanfield committed an aggravated battery on a child [W.F.] under 12
years of age; and, four, in doing so caused the death of [W.F.].
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. if each of the above has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant guilty.
The state does not have to prove that the defendant intended to kill
[W.F.], but the state must prove that during the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate an aggravated battery on a child under 12 years of age, the
defendant killed [W.F.].
An act is "willful" or done "wilfully" [sic] when done on purpose.
One cannot act willfully without intending to violate the law, to injure
another, or to acquire any advantage.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.4370, L.21 - p.4372, L.3; see also Instruction Nos.19-23, R., pp.693-98.)
Now, for the first time on appeal, Stanfield claims that the district court erred by failing to
instruct the jury that specific intent was required in a felony murder case where the
underlying felony was an aggravated battery on a child under the age of 12.
(Appellant's brief, pp.23-35). Specific intent, however, is not required in felony murder
cases where the predicate felony is an aggravated battery on a child under the age of
12. Stanfield has therefore failed to show error, much less fundamental error entitling
her to review of this unpreserved claim.
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B.

Standard Of Review
V'./hether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appei!ate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654
(2000) ).

"An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the

instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v. Shackelford, 150
Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459,
462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)).

C.

Stanfield Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The District Court's Proper
Instructions To The Jury
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must

be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588,

261 P.3d at 865 ("An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on
appeal.") (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This
same principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See !.C.R. 30(b) ("No party
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to
which the party objects and the grounds of the objection."); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588,
261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
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Id.; see also State v.

Stanfield did not object to the jury instructions below. Thus, to prevail on appeal,
Stanfield must show that the complained of instruction rises to the level of fundamental
error. Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Stanfield to demonstrate
that the error she aileges: "(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived constitutional
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
Correctly applying this three-prong test to Stanfield's claim, she has failed to show
fundamental error entitling her to review of this unpreserved issue.
For the first time on appeal, Stanfield asserts that the district court erred by not
giving the jury a specific intent instruction, arguing that felony murder requires the
"specific intent to commit the underlying felony," in this case aggravated battery on a
child under 12 years of age. (Appellant's brief, pp.26-35.) The Idaho Supreme Court
recently decided this issue in State v. Carver, Docket No. 39467, 2013 Opinion No. 111
(Idaho, November 26, 2013). 1 In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "the
district court correctly instructed the jury that Defendant would be guilty of first degree
murder if he committed a battery upon the child which resulted in great bodily harm,
from which the child died."

kl

at 7. Rejecting an identical argument as that raised by

Stanfield, the Supreme Court further noted that "[i]nstructing the jury that Defendant had
to have intended to cause great bodily harm to the child would not have been an
accurate statement of the law."

kL

1

Stanfield did not have the benefit of State v. Carver when she filed her Appellant's
brief.
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This case is :r.distinguishable from Carver: the district court's instructions in this
case are the same as those found proper by the Idaho Supreme Court in Carver:
Stanfield's argument is identical to that raised and rejected in Carver. The result in this
case should therefore be the same as that in Carver: Stanfield has failed to show error,
much iess fundamental error, in the district court's proper instructions to the jury.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Stanfield's conviction and
sentence.

DATED this 17th day of December, 2013.
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